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The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission 
and Local Public Health Experts in the 
American South, 1909-1916
HIRATAI Yumi
 Hookworm disease, one of the “diseases of laziness” along with 
malaria and pellagra, afflicted people in the American South until the first 
half of the twentieth century. Some local physicians paid attention to the 
prevention of this endemic disease after scientists, such as Bailey Ashford 
and Charles Wendell Stiles, discovered the pathogen “ancylostoma” in the 
soil in the early 1900s. However, the overall indifference and unwillingness 
to recognize the problem by physicians and lay people made the efforts for 
prevention sporadic.1  The control of diseases required updated information, 
motivation, funds, and administrative support.
 Massive efforts to control hookworm disease began in 1909, 
when the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (hereafter “the RSC”) started 
its investigation in Southern states to improve people’s health and to give 
the southern districts an incentive for establishing local public health 
institutions. During this five-year program, the RSC conducted infection 
surveys and delivered education, followed by dispensary work and, 
eventually, intensive community health work that also covered maladies 
other than hookworm disease. After the RSC dissolved in 1915, the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) continued to support community health work 
through the International Health Commission (IHC) until federal funds were 
poured into the South in the New Deal era. Controlling hookworm disease 
was the beginning of the institutionalization of public health apparatuses 
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covering the health of the local people.2 
 Historians have studied the conditions in which the RSC’s programs 
and activities were conducted, and if the programs really did improve the 
public health administrations in the Southern states. William Link placed the 
philanthropic groups’ activities in the context of the Southern progressive 
movements at the turn of the twentieth century. He observed that outside 
reformers, who cooperated with the state officers, helped to modernize 
health and educational institutions in the community, though they 
faced strong resistance from the local traditionalists and were, therefore, 
compelled to revise or withdraw their initial plans.3  In the field of public 
health, people would generally be reluctant to accept new measures, such 
as changing lifestyles, much less vaccination. The chief motive of the local 
public health experts should have been health improvement of the local 
residents, however, what they thought of outside reformers―cooperators, 
directors, or otherwise―is not clear in Link’s argument. It seems the local 
experts were rather passive toward the residents’ health improvement. 
 Focusing on the development of public health systems in the 
Southern states, Cheryl Elman, Robert A. McGuire, and Barbara Wittman 
argued that the RSC tailored its strategy to fit the circumstances, eventually 
supporting progressive districts with enthusiastic local elites. They also 
demonstrated that not all interventions were effective, and that population 
size, economic stability, and local leaders’ attitudes influenced the results.4 
This argument resonates with other historians’ discussions that the 
development of public health was closely tied with the level of political and 
economic modernization of the city or state.5  For example, Judith Sealander 
points out that public health campaigns were effective if the balance of 
education and enforcement worked well.6  Where public administration 
systems could support public health measures, philanthropic reformers 
were able to adjust their methods for intervention, and continue or increase 
its subsidy. The less developed districts did not fully utilize the help and 
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were eventually left out.
 In the process of institutionalization, prior studies do not argue 
much on the role of local public health professionals who are described 
as subordinates of the RSC or as critics of the reform. Were they mere 
reactors to the reform campaigns? As Steven Stowe, Steven J. Hoffman, 
and other historians of the Southern health professionals have shown, 
there was an aggregation of local medical and public health professionals 
with modern medical education in the South, some of whom had trained 
in Massachusetts, New York, and even Berlin and Paris.7  While it was true 
that many of the medical schools in the South were deemed inadequate in 
the Flexner Report in 1910, there were also suitable medical schools. Under 
severe budget restrictions, health officials with modern medical training 
struggled to improve or standardize their health systems, educate the local 
people, and promote sanitation and quarantines. What did the competent 
professionals do when the RSC deployed its personnel?
 In this article, I argue that the RSC was, to a considerable extent, 
driven by the local public health professionals of states that had established 
relatively solid public health institutions before the RSC intervened. I 
also argue that the RSC was a Southern modernizing project operated by 
the Southerners using Rockefeller’s funds, which invited mixed reactions 
from the RF commissioners, while also establishing inconspicuous policy 
cooperation with some states. Of the several states that accepted the RSC 
hookworm eradication teams, this article focuses on North Carolina and 
the other states that followed its example. The state of North Carolina 
had already established its permanent Board of Health when the RSC first 
arrived; its health officers helped to shape and reshape the RSC’s activities, 
and later those of the Rockefeller Foundation’s IHC. 
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State Directors of the RSC: local public health experts
 The appointment of Wickliffe Rose―a professor of history and 
philosophy at the University of Nashville, Tennessee―as Administrative 
Director of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in 1909 was intended to 
win over the Southerners. While Charles Wendell Stiles, of the Department 
of Agriculture, had promoted himself to Administrative Director, his lack of 
social skills led to his appointment as the RSC’s Scientific Director, keeping 
him away from public relations.8  Rose was not an expert in public health or 
epidemiology. Rather, he was an excellent communicator with experience of 
an educational reform project through the General Education Board, another 
Rockefeller-funded philanthropic organization. Accordingly, Rose knew 
how the public may react to campaigns operated by the staff associated with 
a renowned big business, and how to gain cooperation from state officials. 
 The RSC initiated its work by asking the Southern states to appoint 
a state director of sanitation from among the local public health officers. 
Officially known as the “state director” and appointed through either the 
State Board of Health or the State Governor, this individual was responsible 
for conducting investigations and engaging with local physicians regarding 
hookworm disease. Each state director appointed three field directors and a 
laboratory staff.
 This organizational design demonstrates two points. First, Rose 
was careful to make arrangements local, or at least give the impression that 
the arrangements were of local origin, so that the residents would accept the 
information without becoming unnecessarily resistant. Rose was particular 
about showing the public that the project originated in each state and that 
the RSC had been invited to help them. Replying to the inquiry from the 
state director of Arkansas as to whether he should conduct the hookworm 
campaign exclusively in the name of the State Board of Health, omitting any 
reference to the RSC, Rose wrote that:
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this work should be done in each State in such a way as to direct attention toward 
the State Board of Health. To this end, all officers should be regarded as officers of 
the State Board of Health, as they really are.9
Residents or local physicians would have perceived the investigation as 
being conducted by a health officer from the State Board of Health. The 
Rockefeller name was noticed only if they happened to see the letterhead of 
the documents carried by the investigators, or if they carefully read the local 
newspaper.
 Second, Rose designed the organizations to help local institutions 
and professionals accumulate positive and practical experiences, ensuring 
that they could assume responsibility for continuing the work after the 
RSC withdrew from the region. Benjamin Washburn, a field inspector 
appointed by State Director John A. Ferrell of North Carolina, wrote 
in his autobiography that the RSC was careful to utilize local existing 
organizations and to secure the support of local experts:
Throughout the South the campaign was conducted through existing agencies... 
This proved to be a most important arrangement since it encouraged Boards of 
County Commissioners to appropriate funds for health work, a thing they had 
never done before.10
Through the hookworm project, Rose aimed to help improve or establish 
(depending on the advancement of each state when the RSC arrived) a 
system of public health administrations in the Southern states. To Rose, 
this endeavor implemented the general rule set by John Rockefeller when 
he established the RSC―“to promote the well-being and to advance 
the civilization of the peoples of the United States and its territories 
and possessions...”―by helping to modernize the states’ public health 
institutions.11
 The appointed state directors were public health modernizers in 
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their own states. Arkansas State Director Morgan Smith, who graduated 
from a medical school in Little Rock and trained at Tulane University in 
New Orleans, had previously strived to establish a permanent public health 
board as a faculty of University of Arkansas Medical School. He took his 
appointment of state director of the hookworm project as an opportunity to 
realize his aim.12  Tennessee’s Olin West, Associate Professor of Chemistry 
at Vanderbilt University, became Secretary and Chief Executive of the 
Tennessee Board of Health in 1918 after serving as the State Director.13 
John A. Ferrell, a graduate of the University of North Carolina and 
North Carolina State University Medical School at Raleigh, was a County 
Superintendent of Public Health, and members of the State Board of Health 
were aware of his competence.14  There were political appointments, such 
as that of the state director of Louisiana, which Rose initially opposed 
because of the appointee’s limited skills, though he soon backed down. 
However, generally, states nominated qualified persons with sufficient local 
connections.15 
 Cooperating with state agencies, the RSC’s state directors selected 
communities for investigation of hookworm infection and soil pollution, 
dispatched sanitary inspectors and laboratory engineers, and inspected 
schoolchildren, university students, orphans in asylums, and state militias. 
Their findings proved that hookworm disease was deeply rooted in the 
Southern communities. More than 90% of the inspected counties were 
polluted by hookworm eggs. Hookworm infection rates among the residents 
varied between 10% and 80%, and the results seemed to reflect the ratio 
of privy installations. The infection rates of black residents were generally 
lower than those of whites, and their symptoms were lighter.16  The state 
and field directors instructed hookworm carriers to consult their physicians, 
while simultaneously providing local physicians with information and 
medicine to treat hookworm disease. Through lectures, bulletins, posters, 
inspections, and press conferences, the directors educated the public 
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and encouraged them to undergo examination and treatment by a local 
physician.17  States were required to expend funds matching the RSC’s 
contributions and implement sanitary policies into law. For example, 
Virginia and Louisiana both enacted a law requiring public schools to install 
privies.18
 The first year results of the RSC’s work were ambiguous. The 
residents enjoyed the lectures and lantern slides on hookworm disease, 
but the number of people examined was below expectation. In addition, 
many local physicians were reluctant to cooperate and refused to report 
the number of disease incidences they had diagnosed. “We still have many 
skeptical physicians, and no more irrefutable or convincing evidence as 
to the prevalence and severity of hookworm disease could be furnished 
than your annual report placed in their hands,” C.W. Garrison of Arkansas 
grumbled in a 1912 letter to Rose.19  Considering these results, the RSC 
decided to examine and treat the disease themselves through dispensaries―
field hospitals that would focus on education rather than treatment.20
Dispensaries and their Limits
 Prior to the implementation of dispensaries, state directors 
presented mixed reactions about the plan’s effect. Ferrell and his field forces, 
who appear to have first proposed the idea, enthusiastically formulated 
definite plans, from renting tents to publicizing the plan to North Carolina’s 
citizens.21  Others were worried that local physicians would not cooperate 
with the plan, based on their previous year’s experience. Additionally, the 
dispensary plan required the community to appropriate funds to cover 
outlays such as microscopists’ travel expenses, costs of tins and drugs, and 
printing expenses.22  It was unlikely that communities with limited budgets 
would agree to fund projects that the residents did not support. Even Rose 
was “strongly of the opinion that the people would not come to dispensaries 
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for examination and treatment.”23
 To make the dispensary plan workable, dedicated state and 
field directors smoothed the path by approaching key figures to sway 
local sentiments. They conferred with and sought endorsements from 
local newspapers and prominent people. They also engaged with existing 
organizations, such as women’s clubs, education boards, churches, mill 
owners, etc., asking them to advise their members to come to the local 
dispensary.24  They prepared striking visual displays, such as worm 
specimens discharged from patients, photographs showing patient 
comparisons before and after the treatment, and a model sanitary privy. 
When the first dispensary was opened in Columbia, Mississippi, on 
December 15, 1910, the staff was surprised to see many locals. As other 
dispensaries were established in North and South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, newspapers that had 
previously been critical of the RSC’s projects started to publish positive 
reports about the work of the dispensaries.25 
 State directors exchanged information on the implementation of 
dispensaries and sought to maximize their educational function. Ferrell 
impressed upon other directors, besides Rose, that to gain the cooperation 
of local doctors, it was important to assure them that dispensaries would 
not infringe upon their interests as regards prescribing medicine, as the 
dispensaries would only be in place for a few weeks.26  The state directors 
also reported that dispensaries had been successfully used in Puerto Rico 
and other locations to reduce incidents of hookworm disease, and persuaded 
local leaders to endorse the activity.27  While implementing the dispensaries, 
the directors realized the importance of their wives’ role in attracting 
the attention of local women. Therefore, they arranged for their wives to 
develop good relationships with the locals and to advise them to bring 
specimens for examination.28  The dispensaries operated for six to eight 
weeks in each community, outreached to as many people as possible, akin 
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to a missionary tour, and then moved to another community. State directors 
learned valuable lessons from the experience, developed new publicity 
skills, and shared both of these with each other. 
 In 1912, the RSC’s works in states like North Carolina, Mississippi, 
and Georgia were generally supported by the local press, boards of 
education, schools, churches, women’s clubs, and local physicians. The state 
and field directors of such successful states outreached to black communities 
too, and Ferrell even suggested hiring a black physician as a field director, 
which would enable him to visit schools, churches, and homes to educate 
the people. While hiring a black physician would “greatly strengthen the 
work of our forces,” Ferrell explained to Rose in 1910, “the salary and 
travelling expense of such a man would not have to be as much as paid to 
the white” field directors.29  Though not all counties in the Southern states 
supported and invited dispensaries, nor did all local leaders accept the 
proposed distribution of medicine to black residents, a cycle of publicity, 
investigation, participation, and treatment began to gain momentum, as the 
cured patients shared their experiences with their friends and neighbors, 
and the local press favorably reported the results.
 States with less-functioning Boards of Health faced difficulties. 
Arkansas did not have a Board of Health until 1913. The RSC settled in 
Arkansas in 1910, i.e., before the establishment of the Board of Health. After 
the first state director, Smith, resigned due to financial reasons, the locally 
trained and enthusiastic W.W. Garrison assumed the position in 1912. He 
found that many of the measures that Ferrell reportedly implemented 
in North Carolina could not be properly undertaken in his state, given 
the lack of a system to support modern public health work. For example, 
Garrison wished to send pamphlets concerning hookworm disease to local 
doctors but there were no practitioners’ lists―records that were usually 
maintained and updated by a State Board of Health―available. While 
investigating the infection rates, he personally corrected and re-corrected 
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the numbers, possibly because there were no personnel available with 
sufficient knowledge of statistics. The directors did not utilize the available 
infection information at the time of the dispensary’s opening, leading them 
to establish it at a site with a comparatively low infection rate. Work on 
tackling hookworm disease impressed upon public health professionals in 
the South that a modern bureaucratic system of maintaining and utilizing 
records was needed, in addition to updated medical and public health 
knowledge.30
 During the course of its five-year project, the RSC moved its focus 
from initial investigations of hookworm disease, public education, and 
treatment by local practitioners, to dispensary work, where both education 
and treatment were provided. However, Rose and the RSC state directors 
knew that the public’s mindset changed in a limited number of localities, 
while many other communities were beyond the reach of the RSC’s 
educational activities. Moreover, even in communities where awareness of 
the disease had increased, indifference could return at some stage unless the 
residents were regularly updated.
Community Health Work Promotion by Local Health Officials
 The endeavors to control hookworm disease revealed that a 
modern public health system, progressing beyond the establishment of a 
State Board of Health, was needed. The RSC state directors had pressed 
Rose to arrange for the RSC to support intensive community health work, 
which included education on hookworm disease but was not limited thereto. 
Rose was very prudent in handling such demands from the state officials 
and gave non-committal remarks. However, he accepted the need to act 
and persuaded his fellow RSC commissioners that the RF should allocate 
RSC funds for community health work. Eventually, delivering help for 
community health work prolonged the RF’s presence in the South after the 
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RSC’s term ended.
 From the onset of the RSC projects in the South, the RSC state 
directors and state health officials introduced to Rose the importance of 
local health boards. Watson Rankin, Secretary of the North Carolina State 
Board of Health, stated that a community, or a region up to the size of a 
county, constituted a basic unit to implement state health laws, educate 
and supervise the local people, and collect data, such as vital statistics and 
details concerning ongoing disease cases. A full-time health superintendent 
in every county was necessary to conduct this work.31  As early as 1910, 
Rose cooperated with the North Carolina State Board of Health in helping 
to launch a permanent county health board with a full-time health 
superintendent in Guilford County. The superintendent of Guilford County 
investigated the sanitation of public schools, demonstrated how to reduce 
typhoid fever, disinfected houses and public buildings, and collected vital 
statistics concerning the local residents.32  These were definitely important 
practices to supervise and improve people’s health. Nonetheless, for the 
RSC commissioners, especially Chairman Frederick Gates, these works 
were considered to have only a weak link to hookworm eradication. Why 
Rose undertook to persuade the commissioners to help this project―which 
should have been the responsibility of the State of North Carolina―requires 
some explanation.
 In 1909, having just been appointed as Secretary of the North 
Carolina State Board of Health, Rankin was struggling to modernize the 
public health administration. Repeatedly quoting the Earl of Derby’s phrase, 
“sanitary instruction is even more important than sanitary legislation,”33 he 
demanded county superintendents to implement state health laws. The local 
governments, however, did not follow Rankin’s lead due to indifference, 
lack of budget, or local pride that their people were healthy and robust. 
Support from the notable physicians of the North Carolina Medical Society 
was not enough to move the rank-and-file physicians and superintendents 
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of health in the countryside.34  Rankin’s perspective was that the state 
should comprehensively control the public health administration, as its 
head, and that the local governments―counties, cities, and towns―should 
implement the state’s policies effectually. Without budget allocation from 
the state, however, it was difficult for the counties to follow his edicts. 
Rankin perceived that establishing a model county would be helpful; if 
health work was effectively conducted and reduced diseases in this model 
county, then other counties would follow suit.35  It seems that Rankin may 
have thought the United States Public Health Service (PHS) should play the 
role of coordinating and subsidizing a model county project. In his letter 
to Surgeon General Rupert Blue, he drew Blue’s attention to the subject as 
follows: “This piece of work is, in the very nature of things, a function of the 
Federal Government, or, more particularly, the United States Public Health 
Service.”36
 Before appealing to the PHS, Rankin had brought the idea to Rose 
in 1910. Rose decided to help community health work in Guilford County 
as a part of the hookworm eradication work. “Observation of the work in 
Guilford County,” wrote Rose, “convinces me that with an effective county 
superintendent of health devoting his whole time to the work in any county, 
there is no reason why hookworm disease should not within reasonable 
time be stamped out and kept out...”37  Following this cooperative work 
in Guilford, Rankin often raised the subject of community/county health 
work in his communication with Rose, demanding that the RSC should 
fund it. Rankin wrote to Rose that the purpose of both the North Carolina 
State Board of Health and the RSC was to educate the people and let them 
support their county health boards. Moreover, the money the RSC had spent 
in North Carolina―$20,000 per year―could have been used more wisely if 
the RSC had allocated the funds to intensive local health work, rather than 
upon short-term dispensary work: “This short cut to our chief end, would, 
in my present opinion, make a ten times more valuable demonstration than 
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any other form of work which I have thought that we might pursue.”38 
Responding to Rankin, Rose explained that if he had a discretionary 
fund, he would not hesitate to use it as Rankin indicated; however, “the 
Commission would have authority to use its funds” and allocation had not 
yet been decided.39  The fact that Rankin and other officials, such as Ferrell 
and J.L. Ludlow―a member of the North Carolina State Board of Health―
sent similar letters to Rose at the time showed how eagerly they wished to 
cooperate with, or more precisely receive funds from, the RSC.40
 The state directors and the public health officials preferred 
intensive community health work to dispensary work as the former would 
provide information and measures to prevent diseases in general, rather 
than only hookworm disease. Furthermore, it was expected to help local 
public health officials in two ways: first, it would provide a practical 
visualization of standard health work to the residents of neighboring areas, 
subsequently persuading them to adopt and fund similar work; second, it 
would provide means of persuading the general assemblies to enact new 
health laws. At least in North Carolina, the RSC staff was more aligned 
with their own state and did not contemplate Rockefeller or the RSC’s 
commissioners take on this matter.
 As a former educational reformer, Rose recognized the importance 
of community health work but encountered difficulties in persuading his 
superiors, such as RSC Chairman Frederick Gates and John Rockefeller. 
Rockefeller and Gates had agreed from the program’s start that the 
endowment should end in 1914 as the program aimed to incentivize, rather 
than fully produce, the improvement of public health administrations in 
the South. Furthermore, providing help for community health work would 
risk the burdens of permanent supervision and funding, leading the states 
to become dependent on the RF.41  Knowing the importance of community 
health work, but hesitating to inflame the debate, Rose managed to find a way 
to satisfy the RSC commissioners, state directors, and state health officials.
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Persuading the Rockefeller Foundation Commissioners for 
Community Health Work
 As Gates became more interested in the field of international health 
and medicine, scientists and medical experts formed an influential collective 
in the Rockefeller philanthropy circle. When the RF launched the IHC in 
1913, Gates proposed to close the activities in the South in 1914 as had been 
initially planned, and shift focus to the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia. 
RF scientists were interested in developing vaccines and medicines, and 
exchanging medical information in Europe. With Rockefeller facing fierce 
criticism after the bloody Ludlow strike in the Rockefeller-owned Colorado 
mine in 1913-14, and RF’s failure to obtain a charter from the Congress,42 
Gates was inclined to end support for health work in the U.S. From his 
perspective, the RSC had stimulated the Southern states to progress 
to establishing a permanent public health system, as many states now 
recognized that the hookworm disease was a real menace to people’s health, 
and was curable. For Rose, however, the situation concerning the system 
of public health administration in the South was only in the infancy, and it 
needed to be stimulated through dispensary work and other initiatives.43 
Rose, as the RSC’s administrative director and director of the IHC, looked for 
routes that would enable pursuit of the Rockefeller projects abroad, whilst 
simultaneously providing ongoing support in the South.
 Earlier, Rose himself seemed to have been more interested in 
operating hookworm projects abroad. In 1910, he wrote to Surgeon-General 
Walter Wyman of the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service and asked 
him to gather information on hookworm infection in foreign countries by 
cooperating with the State Department.44  After scrutinizing the findings, 
Rose drew Wyman’s attention to Mexican immigrants, writing that they 
were responsible for “a considerable stream of hookworm infection 
coming into this country,” and suggesting appropriate actions.45  Without 
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the pressure to support intensive community health work, Rose would 
have withdrawn completely from the South and concentrated entirely on 
international work.
 One reason for Rose’s decision to continue supporting the South 
was that he came to share deep concerns with his state directors through 
everyday communication―the Boards of Health of each state were 
generally subject to severe budgetary limitations and needed subsidies to 
conduct basic administration duties, such as collection of vital statistics and 
laboratory work.46  Enhancing health work in communities was far more 
important than temporary dispensary work to educate people and improve 
their health.47  The local physicians needed to be educated first, followed 
by curriculum improvement of local medical schools.48  State directors and 
field staff wished to improve health conditions using scientific practices but 
had failed to do so due to local politics, indifference, prejudices, and budget 
scarcity. During their struggles, the RSC had suddenly appeared, helping to 
activate the pursuit of their objectives, and actually realizing some of them. 
Rose’s personal views may have resonated with such voices.
 By supporting community health work, Rose had understood 
that continuous support was necessary to help improve public health 
administration in the Southern states. The hookworm project pushed the 
movement forward, but setbacks would surely follow as state budgets 
were generally limited and local politics could lose interest in public health, 
potentially leading to the dissolution of the recently born local health 
boards. Such observations led Rose to implore Gates that “the county health 
service can be made effective. At present this is the weakest spot in the 
state system.”49  It would take time to ensure the smooth functioning of 
the health system, a view that was shared by all the state directors.50  Rose 
sought to induce the IHC to focus on the system as a whole, rather than 
upon a single disease. Therefore, he selected several communities to which 
to provide funds for the purpose of hookworm control. In 1913, community 
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health work became the focus of Rose’s activities, thereby prolonging the 
endowment from Rockefeller to the South.
 Rose continued to persuade Gates and the other commissioners 
to support intensive community health work. However, the outcome was 
not very favorable: “After an all day conference with Mr. Gates concerning 
the work which we are opening up, it seems to be necessary to postpone 
action for the present looking toward the full time county health officer.”51 
Community health work had already started in Guilford, North Carolina, 
and some other states were showing interest in this type of work. Rose not 
only reported the significance of supporting intensive community health 
work at the commissioners’ meeting, but also created a fait accompli, writing 
to Ferrell in the following terms:
You will be free to cooperate with Dr. Rankin in any way that seems advisable to 
Dr. Rankin and yourself. I hope you will succeed in getting the work organized on 
an effective basis. Personally, I regret that there is anything to prevent our giving 
you the cooperation, which I indicated at our conference the other day.52
Eventually, this accumulation of facts would influence the commissioners’ 
decisions.
 The appointment of Ferrell as Rose’s assistant director in July 1913 
was a definite step taken by Rose to further persuade the RF commissioners 
to support community health work. Ferrell had been state director of the 
hookworm eradication project in North Carolina for two and a half years, 
a dedicated planner and an effective coordinator who administered the 
dispensary work, and an enthusiastic supporter of community health work. 
He had proved through his work as a state director that he had a high 
level of competence, and Rose had personally introduced him to Stiles and 
Rockefeller as a promising health worker.53  By appointing Ferrell, Rose 
ensured that work could be undertaken both overseas and domestically. 
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Rose focused mainly on operations in foreign countries, while Ferrell 
concentrated on activities in the South. In fact, after the IHC was launched, 
Rose was assigned to travel around the Caribbean and Latin America as 
Director of the IHC, and around Europe in coordinating war relief on behalf 
of Rockefeller, while Ferrell remained in Washington, D.C. to support 
community health work and hookworm investigations.54
 If Rose had not appointed Ferrell, the RSC’s projects would have 
remained confined to investigation and dispensary work, and no other 
demonstration of community health work would have been conducted. 
Ferrell was a competent health official with unbounded ideas, and he led 
communications and conferences among other state directors. He took the 
initiative by converting activity plans for dispensary and community health 
work into tangible programs, which the other directors admired.55  Ferrell 
maintained close communication with Rankin and shared his outlook on 
how local public health administration should develop. When Rankin 
learned of Ferrell’s appointment, he wrote to Ferrell “the Lord is on our 
side and we are going to win out any way” on community health work. 
To Rankin, it seemed that he had sent his subordinate, Ferrell, to realize 
cooperation with the RF.56
 After a long debate among the commissioners over whether the RF 
would continue or terminate support, and whether the support would cover 
research and control of hookworm disease only or other diseases also, the 
RF decided to subsidize community health work after the RSC concluded 
its five-year-program on eradicating hookworm disease. Community health 
work was the project that state health officers had moved Rose, and that 
Rose made use of to ensure that the IHC stayed in the South after the RSC 
was terminated. The pilot project on Knotts Island, North Carolina, was 
symbolic as its success―hookworm disease was completely eradicated 
from the island and diseases such as typhoid and malaria were successfully 
controlled―persuaded the IHC commissioners to extend their help in the 
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South. If the RSC’s administrative director had been Charles Stiles, who 
Gates had initially considered for the role, the RSC’s termination would 
have been the end of the RF’s support for public health in the South, as Stiles 
seemed only to have been interested in tackling hookworm disease.57 
Conclusion
 The RSC for hookworm eradication was terminated in mid-1915, 
and from 1916, cooperation in the provision of community health work 
formally began. The states were required to select counties/communities to 
be involved in the programs, gain consent from the residents―in truth, the 
prominent residents―of the municipalities, and allocate matching funds to 
receive the subsidies from the IHC. The provision of help to community/
county health work in the Southern states, and later in some Midwestern 
and Western states such as Michigan, Ohio, California, Oregon, and others, 
would last until the New Deal, when matching funds for improving public 
health administration were injected by the federal government. Up to the 
end of 1932, 748 counties had established a health board, and the RF aided 
442 of them. Mostly due to the Great Depression, 176 county health boards 
were not operational as of December 31, 1932. Among them, the RF had 
aided 109 at some point in time.58 
 It is possible to summarize the significance of the joint activities of 
the RSC and the Southern states as follows: First, rather than an external, 
interventionist agency, the RSC could be characterized as a collective entity 
of local health professionals. The State Boards of Health appointed RSC 
state directors, while the field directors were selected from among local 
public health experts with knowledge of scientific medicine. These local 
professionals had opportunities to pursue initiatives consistent with the 
policies they wished to realize, while Rose played the role of mediator 
between the RF and the state public health officials. Rose proficiently 
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handled dealings with the press and correspondence with state directors 
and commissioners; he expressly instructed the state directors not to use 
the Rockefeller name but to use only their own state’s name when they 
delivered education or operated dispensaries, which made the RSC’s local 
directors feel more state-oriented. Because of Rose’s framework, the RSC’s 
state directors felt connected to their own State Board of Health. While they 
followed instructions from the RF’s commissioners delivered via Rose, they 
also influenced and shaped the RF’s policy on how they should be helped.
 Second, the RSC’s involvement was more beneficial for states 
that had already institutionalized their public health bureaucracy, 
contrary to Rockefeller and Gates’ wish to improve the “slower” states. 
As explained above, the RSC aimed to establish and improve state health 
administrations through the hookworm campaigns, with the longer-term 
objective of ensuring sustainable health services for residents. However, in 
practice, the states that had already established a modern administration 
system, including a personnel-training system, were those that accepted 
the cooperative work suggested by the RSC, and, therefore, succeeded in 
improving their preexisting health administrations. In North Carolina, Rose 
smoothly negotiated with Rankin on who should be appointed as the state 
director of the hookworm eradication project, which counties to investigate, 
how to share costs, and how to manage dispensary work. Furthermore, 
cooperative work with school boards, churches, local leaders, and local 
women’s clubs was effective compared to other states’ experiences. In 
Alabama, for example, implementing community health work was difficult 
due to limited number of personnel with appropriate knowledge and skills, 
and organizations that would be able to cooperate with the RSC were 
scarce.59  The social conditions required to accept and support a bureaucratic 
system had already been developed in North Carolina, thus reinforcing 
the argument of Elman, McGuire, and Wittman that counties with greater 
population densities, higher school attendance rates, and greater economic 
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development were likely to cooperate well with the RSC.60
 While North Carolina enjoyed favorable conditions, the directors of 
less favored states urged for improvement and gained workable ideas and 
moral support through communication among state directors. They shared 
complaints regarding the RSC’s budgets, the states’ scarce appropriations, 
local physicians’ indifference, and the residents’ forgetfulness, accompanied 
by constructive discussions on subsequent steps. Their activities to improve 
the residents’ health gradually changed the stance of once-indifferent local 
leaders, influencing them to invite dispensaries and support intensive 
community health work.
 Neither the state directors nor Rose openly discussed how 
they should cooperate with black physicians. State and field directors 
investigated black residents, opened dispensaries, and diagnosed and 
treated those who were infected. They contemplated hiring black physicians 
to save costs. Black physicians and medical students would have been happy 
to cooperate had they been asked, as the latter were eager for practical 
training. In the segregated South, black medical experts were excluded from 
both white and black hospitals.61  Stiles would have been able to challenge 
this, though the outcome would most likely not have been as favorable.
 The RSC, and later the IHC, continued to provide help well beyond 
1915 when the RSC was dissolved, until the New Deal subsidies for public 
health came to the Southern states. Under the World War I pressures, 
Spanish influenza, and the 1920s rural economic hardship, how did the state 
public health officials improve their states’ institutions and raise residents’ 
awareness by requesting support from philanthropic organizations and the 
PHS? What were their views on the trend of feminization in public health, 
especially public health nurses supported by the Sheppard-Towner Act or 
the Red Cross? By expanding the considered duration of the Rockefeller 
men’s activities to the 1920s, many questions arise, offering opportunities for 
future research.
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